Introduction
In this paper I explore the determination of residential and job location and the pattern of commuting behavior in an urban model with decentralized employment. Various authors have explored models of cities with decentralized employment, but they have tended to make very specialized assumptions concerning either the pattern of firm location or the nature of household behavior and have often been forced to use numerical simulation techniques to get results. In this paper I try to make very general assumptions concerning firm and household behavior. This approach yields fewer definite answers, but it enables me to consider some new questions. 1 The most interesting result of the model is that under some circumstances, households having identical tastes, income and number of workers will occupy different rings around the city center depending on their job locations. This means that cities with decentralized employment may not have the usual residential location pattern in which successively more distant rings around the center are occupied by higher income households. Instead, in this model, households' residential location choice depends on both their workers' job locations and on their income levels. Thus a ring pattern is likely to emerge in which households whose income levels are high but whose job locations are near the center will occupy residential rings that are close to the center. They may be surrounded by rings occupied by lower income households whose jobs are further out. Thus the non-monocentric city has a non-monotonic pattern of income level changes with greater distance from the center.
This richer location pattern is more realistic than the simpler results of the traditional urban model. It provides, for example, a formal model of the "gentrified" location pattern observed in various cities in which high income households locate both near the center and in the far suburbs.
The model also implies that otherwise identical workers will have different job locations depending on their residential locations. In particular workers whose households have closer-in residential locations demand a smaller wage premium for extra commuting than do otherwise identical workers whose households live further out. The conditions under which workers that live further from the center hold more suburbanized jobs are developed.
The model also yields interesting insights concerning how workers' wage offer curves for jobs at particular locations differ according to their skill or income levels. It suggests that the composition of a firm's workforce, i.e., its relative mix of high wage versus low wage workers, is important in determining whether the firm will move out of CBD and, if so, how far. Finally, the model moves toward a more general theory of commuting behavior which synthesizes two previously conflicting views of commuting: that emerging from urban economics, which argues that, longer commuting journeys are compensated by lower housing prices, and that emerging from labor economics, which argues that longer commuting journeys are compensated by higher wages. ' The results suggest that both wages and housing prices adjust to compensate for extra commuting in different circumstances, depending on the direction in which the commuting journey is changed and whether the household moves its job location or its housing location or both. Section 2 of the paper briefly reviews the theory of a city with centralized employment. Section 3 discusses the incentives facing firms making location choices within a metropolitan area and the commuting pattern that results for workers holding suburban jobs. Section 4 introduces decentralized employment into the residential location choice problem and explores its implications for the spatial variation of wages and land prices.
Section 5 explores the model's implications for commuting behavior and considers avenues
for further research.
Residential Location Choice in Cities with Centralized Employment
We start by briefly reviewing the theory of a circular city when all employment is at the central business district (the CBD). Assume that the city is located on a flat featureless plain and that the CBD is a point at its center. All households living in the city have one worker. They have identical utility functions which depend on consumption of land for housing, h, consumption of other goods, x, and leisure time of the worker, (.3 All of these vary with residential distance from the center, denoted u. Thus the utility function is: U = U(h(a),x(u),I(u)).
(1)
Workers receive a fixed wage rate of w* per hour for working at the CBD at jobs whose hours are assumed to be continuously variable. Monetary commuting cost is m dollars per mile travelled in either direction and is constant at all locations. Commuting speed is 1/s miles per hour and is also constant at all locations. Thus round trip monetary commuting costs are 2mu and round trip commuting time is 2us. The rent per unit of land for housing at distance u is p(ts). Households have a budget constraint and workers are assurned to have a time constraint. Total time available, 24 hours per day, must be split among leisure, work and commuting. Combining the household's time and money constraints results in the "full income" constraint:
where 24w* -2(sw* + m)u is full income or the amount that workers could earn net of time and money commuting expenses if they worked 24 hours a day.
Households maximize the utility function over their choice of h(u), x(u), . and 1(u), subject to the full income constraint. The full income constraint must hold at all locations.
Therefore we can substitute eq. (2) into eq. (1) to get:
Totally differentiating the utility function using the envelope theorem, we can derive the condition on rent levels at different distances from the center such that a household achieves equal utility at all residential locations. We get the following well-known condition which is referred to as the household's rent offer curve for housing:
h(u)
where subscripts indicate partial derivatives.
Since work hours are flexible, the value of time at the margin must be w*. Thus the numerator of (3) is the total cost of commuting an extra mile round trip, including the monetary outlay and the value of time. Since the right hand side of (3) is negative, the rent offer curve must always decline with distance from the city center.
Differentiating eq. (3) with respect to u and substituting eq. (3) into the resulting expression, we get
The percent change in the rate of decrease of the rent offer curve must equal minus the percent change in housing consumption with increased residential suburbanization. Since consumption of land for housing rises in the suburbs where rents are lower, hu is positive.
The left hand side of (4) is therefore negative, so 8pu/8u must be positive. The slope of the rent offer curve for housing thus gets flatter as u increases.
Equation (3) describes a necessary condition on the rent offer curve such that households having the utility function and full income constraint in eqs. (1) and (2) achieve equal utility at all locations in a city having centralized employment. But if all households in the city have identical tastes and incomes and if all have one worker whose job is at the center, then the market equilibrium rent gradient must also satisfy eqs. (3) and (4) . The market equilibrium rent gradient is denoted p" m (u).
Extending the model, suppose households still have identical tastes, but some workers are skilled and some are unskilled. Skilled workers receive a wage rate of wb* per hour and unskilled workers receive a lower wage rate of wd* per hour. In this case we can derive separate conditions on the rent offer curves for each of the two groups. They are:
for unskilled workers and a similar condition (with superscripts d) for skilled workers.
Both skilled and unskilled workers' rent offer curves must decline at a decreasing rate with distance. Skilled workers' households have higher demand for housing than unskilled workers' households at any u, which tends to make their rent offer curves flatter. However skilled workers' time is more valuable at the margin, which tends to make their rent offer curve steeper. In general the first effect is usually assumed to be more important, making the rent offer curve flatter for skilled than unskilled workers. Given this assumption, the two rent offer curves are depicted in Figure 1 . Skilled workers' households outbid unskilled workers' households for land at suburban locations and unskilled workers' households outbid skilled workers' households at more central locations. Each group of households is now indifferent to locating over a range of distances from the center, rather than everywhere in the city. The market equilibrium rent gradient is the upper envelope of the two groups' rent offer curves. It is shown as the dashed line in Figure 1 .
With two income groups in the city, unskilled workers' households thus occupy a region shaped like a thick ring around the CBD from distance u = 0 to u' in all directions and skilled workers' households occupy a surrounding thick ring from distances u = u' to the outer edge of the city, u*. The boundary between the ring occupied by unskilled and skilled workers' households occurs at some location u'. However we have not given the model enough structure to be able to determine the intercepts of the two functions or the distance u' from the center at which they intersect. 4 
Firm Location Choice
In this section we briefly examine the problem of firm location choice and the characteristics of labor markets in cities with decentralized employment. In particular we are interested in establishing conditions under which at least some firms in the city have an incentive to move out of the CBD. But we also wish to rule out conditions in which so much firm suburbanization occurs that there is no commuting at all, because all workers work at home at very srmall firms. We use v to denote workplace location, where v is measured in miles from the CBD in any direction.
The city is assumed to be located on a flat featureless plain, where land is not specialized for use in housing versus in production. Also there is no zoning or other type of land use regulation which might set particular regions of the city aside for particular land uses. Firms are assumed to occupy some but not all of the land in all rings around the CBD. Therefore the price that they pay for land in that ring is its value when used for housing, or pm(u).& The assumption that some firms locate at all rings around the center is made for convenience, since it allows workplace location, v, to be treated as a continuous variable. But the general results of the model would not be changed if firms located in some, but not all, suburban rings.
The wage which suburban firms must pay their workers depends on how much workers' commuting journeys are shortened when the firm moves out of the CBD. Firms gain the most from suburbanizing if after the move their workers live both further from the CBD than the firm itself and in the same direction away from the CBD (i.e., along the same ray from the CBD). We assume that all workers who take jobs at suburban firms satisfy both of these conditions. This could be because workers already live in the relevant region for their particular employer, or because they move there when the firm does or because the firm hires new workers who already live in the relevant region after it moves. The first of these two conditions eliminates the possibility of out-commuting by workers, i.e., it requires that workers live further from the CBD than their jobs. The second condition eliminates circumferential commuting. These assumptions in fact are not as strong as they might appear. For workers to be willing to commute outward or circumferentially to suburban jobs, employers must pay them more than if they commuted in an inward direction to the same jobs. Therefore it is in firms' interest to locate in such a way that all their workers in-commute, i.e., so that all workers live further from the CBD than their employers and along the same ray from the CBD. 6 Assume that all workers have the same skill level and earn the same wage if they work at jobs in the CBD. The CBD wage is again denoted w*. Since workers taking suburban jobs have lower commuting costs than workers living at the same residential location who work at CBD jobs, employers at any v > 0 are assumed to pay their workers a lower wage than that prevailing at the center. The market wage gradient, denoted turn(v), therefore must be negatively related to workplace location, v, or o9wm(v)/av < 0.
In moving to suburban locations, firms are assumed to spread out in all directions around the CBD. This is because once some firms have located, say, exactly north of the CBD, their presence discourages additional firms from also locating exactly north of the 5 CBD, since all firms located along a single ray from the CBD must compete for workers who live further out along the same ray. Other firms instead will prefer to locate the same distance from the CBD, but one or more degrees away from north in either direction, where the potential labor supply willing to work for the firm at the wage w m (v) is likely to be larger. Thus there are agglomeration diseconomies as more firms locate along any particular ray from the CBD, regardless of how far away from the CBD they locate. If more jobs in total are offered by firms located along any particular ray than there are workers living along the same ray, then firms will only be able to attract enough workers if some workers out-commute or commute circumferentially. But this requires that firms pay higher wages than would be necessary if they spread out in different directions, so that all workers could in-commute. These assumptions imply that no suburban subcenters will form which contain enough firms that they exhaust the labor supply composed of workers who commute inward to the firms they work for.
It is interesting to note that firms which suburbanize drastically restrict the labor market area from which they hire workers. While firms located at the CBD can hire workers who live in any direction from the CBD; firms located, say, north of the CBD can only hire workers who live both north of the CBD and further out than the firm. As a result, moving out of the CBD will tend to be most attractive to firms that are relatively small.
For our purposes, it is not necessary to present a formal model of firms' location decision. Such a model would have firms gain from suburbanizing because they pay lower land prices and lower wages in the suburbs, but their goods transport costs or their costs of production could be higher. Firms would maximize profit over their choice of location, where each location is a ring around the CBD. In such a model, it is reasonable to assume that one suburban ring (or a few) would be the profit-maximizing location for any particular firm. This implies that identical firms would concentrate in one or a few suburban rings, rather than distributing themselves over all suburban rings. However if there were firms in many industries located in the city, then firms in each industry would locate in the profit-maximizing ring for that industry, but nonetheless there would be firms of some type located in many or all suburban rings. Note that agglomeration diseconomies also result if many firms attempt to locate in the same ring. In this case firms would bid up the price of land in that ring, giving themselves an incentive to choose locations in adjacent rings which are slightly closer-in or further-out. These adjacent rings have lower demand and therefore lower prices. If firms instead scatter over many rings, then they will pay for land according to the market rent gradient established for land used for housing. 7
Residential and Job Location Choice in Cities with Decentralized Employrnent
We now generalize the model of household residential and job location choice to allow for decentralized employment. This will enable us to investigate the characteristics of equilibrium market rent and wage gradients in the decentralized city case. Households' full income constraint therefore becomes:
Households
where p(u, v) and w (u, v) are now the rent offer and wage offer curves for the household and its worker. Since all workers in-commute, one-way commuting distance is (
Households maximize utility subject to the full income constraint over their choice 
Households must achieve the same utility level at all workplace/residential location pairs that they choose to occupy. Totally differentiating eq. (7) with respect to u and v and using the envelope theorem, we get: For the worker's household to live at u", its rent offer at u" must be greater than or equal to the rent offer at u" of households whose workers work either closer in or further out than v". Therefore pp(u", v") must equal zero. Then solving for the worker's wage offer curve, we get:
In the next subsection we discuss rent offer curves and market rent gradients further. The following subsection considers wage offer curves and market wage gradients. A third subsection then reintroduces the possibility of workers having multiple skill levels.
Rent Gradients in Decentralized Cities
How do the characteristics of households' rent offer curves compare in the centralized versus the decentralized city cases? Examining eqs. (3) and (10), we find that rent offer curves in the two cases have the same form, except that the wage rate varies with job location in the latter. Rent offer curves therefore must always have negative slopes, regardless of whether employment is centralized or decentralized.
But do rent offer curves also decline with distance at a decreasing rate in the decentralized employment case? To investigate this question, we differentiate eq. (10) with respect to u, assuming an arbitrary fixed job location, v. (This procedure is followed since the rent offer curve for a household gives its level of willingness-to-pay for land for housing at different residential locations, given any fixed job location. Not all residential locations will turn out to be feasible for a household having any particular job location, since it may be outbid by other households for land at some locations, but its offer level can be determined nonetheless.) The result is: We now turn to the question of whether, in a city with decentralized employment, workers' job locations affect households' rent offer curves for land at particular residential locations. In other words, we wish to establish whether or not otherwise identical households whose workers work at different job locations are willing to pay the same amount for land at particular residential locations. If so, then households having different workplace locations will mix together over at least some set of residential locations, as long as all households live further out than their workers' jobs. If not, then households that differ only by workplace location will segregate into different residential rings.
Examining eq. (10) above, we note that households' rent offer curves depend on workplace location, v, as well as on residential location, u. To determine how a household's rent offer curve depends on its worker's job location, we differentiate (10) with respect to v, holding u constant. This allows us to determine how a household's willingness-to-pay schedule for land for housing at all residential locations (including locations at which it will be outbid) varies when its worker's job location changes. The result is: This result is striking because it indicates that households may segregate into different residential rings even when they have identical utility functions, the same number of workers per household, and identical earning abilities. Previous urban models have only resulted in residential segregation when either household tastes or household incomes, or both, are assumed to differ. In this model, workers are indifferent over a range of residential locations and commuting journey lengths, given their job locations. Workers who work at v' will be indifferent among among residential locations between u' and u*, the outer edge of the city. They will therefore be indifferent among commuting journey lengths ranging from a minimum of (u' -v') miles to a maximum of (u* -v') miles. Workers who work at v = 0 will be indifferent among residential locations between u = 0 and u' and among commuting journey lengths ranging from zero to u' miles. However all households in the model achieve equal utility and are indifferent across all job location/residential location pairs in the ranges just enumerated.
Case 2. Now suppose 8p,/8v = 0. In this case, households' rent offer curves for land are unaffected by their workers' job locations, as long as only in-commuting occurs. Then all households' rent offer curves are the same, regardless of their workers' job locations.
In the context of Figure 2 , the two rent offer curves would be identical. This case leads Case S. Finally, suppose ap/av is negative. In this case, rent offer curves by households become steeper as their workers' job locations become more suburbanized. Suppose again that there are only two job locations, at v = 0 and v'. Then the two groups' rent offer curves are shown in Figure 3 . Suburban workers' rent offer curve is now the steeper curve labelled Pi (u), while CBD workers' rent offer curve is now the flatter curve labelled P 2 (u).
Suburban workers' households outbid CBD workers' households for housing at the closer-in region between u = 0 and u', while CBD workers' households outbid suburban workers' 
Wage Gradients in Decentralized Cities
Turn now to the wage gradient. We wish to explore the properties of wage gradients and also to consider whether otherwise identical workers having different residential locations are willing to work for different wage rates at the same workplace location.
We derived an expression for workers' wage offer curves in eq. (11) above. Examining (11) , the numerator is the cost of commuting per mile round trip and the denominator is number of hours of work. With decentralized employment, the wage rate falls with increases in employment suburbanization by the reduction in per mile commuting cost per hour of work. The wage gradient must always be negative. 1 Using the wage and rent offer curves, eqs. (8) and (9), we can determine in a relative sense how quickly they each decline with distance from the CBD. Substituting eq. (8) -2s(u -v) -(u, v) is hours of work. The percent rate of decrease of the wage offer curve per extra mile of workplace distance from the CBD equals the percent rate of decrease of the rent offer curve per extra mile of residential distance from the CBD times the ratio of expenditure on residential land to earnings from labor. The ratio of land expenditure to earnings depends on the location variables; however it must be less than the ratio of housing expenditure to earnings. The latter has been well studied and is usually thought to be around 25%. 12 Thus the wage offer curve should be expected to decline at a much lower proportionate rate with distance from the center than the rent offer curve.
How does the rate of decline of workers' wage offer curves vary as job suburbanization increases, holding residential location constant? To answer this, we differentiate the wage offer curve, eq. (11) (-2s -ne,) is negative, and the sign of Ow,,/Bv must be positive.
Thus workers' wage offer curves must fall at a decreasing rate with greater workplace suburbanization. As long as there is diminishing marginal utility of both leisure and goods, the marginal value of leisure time and work time must increase as the commuting journey gets longer and less time is available for both work and leisure. Leisure time is valued directly and work time is valued because it leads to more income and therefore more non-leisure goods. In order to induce workers to commute further toward the CBD from fixed residential locations and therefore to give up more leisure and/or work time, the wage gradient must allow for the fact that the value of time at the margin is increasing. The wage gradient thus must increase at an increasing rate as v falls, i.e., as the CBD is approached.
It is interesting to note that a negative linear wage gradient is highly unlikely to occur in the context of the model. Suppose we make the strong simplifying assumption that work hours are fixed at n*. In this case, the slope of the wage gradient becomes w,(v) = --2(sw(v) + m)/n*, and aw,/av = -2sw./n* > 0. Thus the wage gradient must still decline at a decreasing rate with greater workplace distance from the CBD. As long as leisure time enters the utility function, the resulting wage gradient cannot decrease at a constant rate with workplace distance. 13 Now consider whether otherwise identical workers whose residential locations differ have different wage offer curves. Examining eq. (11) worker who in-commutes has both a higher wage rate and a higher full income level than the worker who out-commutes. Therefore the worker who in-commutes must be better off than the worker who out-commutes and the situation represented in case 3 cannot be an equilibrium. In order for out-commuting to occur, the market wage gradient must begin to rise rather than fall for job locations further out than v = u*.
We have shown that in a city with decentralized employment in which all workers incommute to their jobs, workers living at different residential locations will tend to prefer different job locations. It is interesting to note that the wage offer curves and market wage gradient discussed here in cases 1 and 2 constitute the maximum possible wage reduction that firms can achieve by moving to suburban locations. With this wage gradient, firms have appropriated all of the gain to workers from shorter commuting journeys when job locations become suburbanized.
Wage and rent gradients when there are multiple skill levels
Suppose now that we reintroduce the possibility that workers have different skill levels and different wage rates. We wish to investigate how rent and wage offer curves and the location pattern vary with workers' wage/skill level in cities with decentralized employment.
Assume that there are two skill groups, skilled workers and unskilled workers. Assume also that there are two employment locations, at v = 0 and v'. Then using the results developed in sections 2 and 4.1 above, one outcome is that there will be four separate residential rings, one for each skill class and workplace location. Such a situation is shown in In this case, the model predicts that firms have stronger incentives to suburbanize as the average skill level and wage rate of their workers rises. This is because the wage offer curves of highly skilled workers fall more steeply with greater workplace distance from the CBD.
In contrast, employers of low skill workers have much less incentive to suburbanize because low skilled workers' flatter wage offer curves cause the cost reduction from suburbanization to be smaller. Further, since low skill workers tend to choose residential locations close to the CBD and there is no out-commuting in the model, employers cannot move very far from the CBD without severely restricting their potential labor supply. This also will tend to keep them close to the CBD.
These results seem realistic in a general way, since we often observe that firms whose workforce contains a high proportion of very skilled workers choose to locate in the subur bs.
Research and development branches of large corporations are an example. In contrast, firms that employ a mixture of highly skilled and less skilled workers seem more likely to locate in the CBD. Banks and brokerage firms are examples of the latter. The rent offer curve for firms has no necessary relation to their wage gradient.
Commuting Behavior and the Indifference Property
In a city with multiple skill levels but only CBD employment (shown in Figure 2 In fact it seemed that the indifference property applying in decentralized cities would be far more general. With suburban as well as CBD job locations as possibilities, workers living in any residential ring could potentially be indifferent over commuting journey lengths ranging from working at home (a zero length commute) to working at the CBD to working anywhere in between. Extensions of the commuting journey caused by changes in workplace location would be compensated by changes in the wage rate, while extensions of the commuting journey caused by changes in residential location would be compensated by income levels, enabling researchers to explore more complex urban location patterns. It also suggests that if good research on commuting patterns is to proceed, we need better data concerning both residential and job location within metropolitan areas, in addition to the obvious need for data on actual commuting journey length. ment decentralization is profitable even when labor shortages in the suburbs require that wages be raised to attract out-commuters, is only reasonable if agglomeration economies or some important cost savings results from locating at the subcenter. In the ring subcenter model, the cost savings results from the existence of a circumferential highway at the subcenter location. 8 The rent and wage offer curves can also be derived straighforwardly from households'
indirect utility function, making use of Roy's Identity.
*Actually, suburban worker' households are willing to bid for land closer-in than v'.
But from these locations they would have to out-commute to work, causing their rent offer curves to decline as they located further from v' in the direction approaching the CBD.
' 0 See White [17] for discussion and estimation of a model of commuting behavior in this case. If there are multiple income/skill levels, then the indifference property discussed above holds within the residential ring chosen by households of that income/skill level.
"Note that if out-commuting occurred, there could be a second region just outside the CBD occupied by households whose workers have CBD jobs.
1'This relationship was pointed out by Muth [9J.
' 3 Many researchers have assumed or derived linear wage gradients in models of decentralized cities, usually in models in which leisure time does not enter households' utility functions. See White [15] and Ogawa and Fujita [10] .
